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Abstract 
 
We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and 
foreign direct investment is often a prisoners’ dilemma game in which a switch from 
exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when 
the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially 
collude by choosing to export rather than invest.  In this range, a reduction in export costs 
may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.      
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1. Introduction 
 
 A familiar feature of the international economy in recent decades has been the 
dramatic increase in foreign direct investment (fdi), with investment flows significantly 
exceeding trade flows, particularly between the developed economies of the OECD.  
Markusen (1995) details the stylized facts that characterize fdi flows; Markusen (2004) 
and Navaretti and Venables (2006) review much of the recent literature on fdi.   
The characteristics of fdi that are of particular relevance to this paper are first, that 
there are considerable intra-industry flows of fdi between developed economies – just as 
there is significant intra-industry trade between the same economies.  Secondly, much of 
the theoretical, game-theoretic literature on fdi treats the choice between exporting and 
direct investment as being driven by a trade-off between tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade and the set-up costs involved in establishing overseas operations.  Thirdly, and in 
seeming contradiction to our second point, fdi has continued to grow apace in recent 
years that have been characterized by significant trade liberalization.   
 One way to “explain” this apparent contradiction is to suggest that much of trade 
liberalization has been associated with economic integration and the growing tendency 
for groups of countries to form free-trade areas: the European Union is just one example 
of many such areas.   In terms of the proximity-concentration hypothesis (Brainard, 
1997), economic integration strengthens the need to be proximate to – located in – the 
free trade area while weakening the loss of economies of scale that arise from spreading 
production over multiple sites.1  The problem with this suggestion is that, while it might, 
for example, account for some of the growth of US fdi in Europe, it does not at all 
                                                 
1  Motta and Norman (1993) and Norman and Motta (1996) provide a theoretical analysis of the potential 
for economic integration to induce fdi. 
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explain why we find an almost identical growth of European fdi in the US, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Flows of Foreign Direct Investment – Europe and US 
(Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.) 
 
Our analysis in this paper investigates a different possible explanation: that firms 
switch from exporting to fdi in response to a reduction in trade costs.  This possibility 
derives from our setting the export/fdi choice in a dynamic, repeated-game framework.  
A singular characteristic of the strategic literature on fdi, starting with the analysis of 
Knickerbocker (1973) and continuing through the work of Horstmann and Markusen 
(1987), Smith (1987), Rowthorn (1992), Motta (1992) and others is that, for not 
particularly restrictive parameter combinations, the underlying game is a prisoners 
dilemma game.  Firms choose fdi in equilibrium whereas they would be better off 
choosing to export.   It is, of course, well known that cooperation in the prisoners’ 
dilemma game can be sustained and the dilemma resolved provided that the players are 
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“sufficiently patient”.   What is surprising, and provides the motivation for this paper, is 
that the implications of this result for the trade/fdi choice have never been investigated.  
This is all the more surprising given that the typical firms that undertake fdi are large, 
established firms in repeated interaction with their rivals. 
Leahy and Pavelin (2003) is the only article of which we are aware that analyzes 
fdi in a repeated-game context.  However, they concentrate on North-South fdi.  
Moreover, they analyze cooperation on outputs supplied from South to North. By 
contrast, our analysis is framed in a North-North setting2 and we consider cooperation in 
the export/fdi choice but not in the output or price choice.   
The rationale for our approach is straightforward.  In our North-North setting, 
tacit cooperation on outputs or prices typically leads to a decision not to supply the 
distant market, giving each firm a local monopoly. 3  The risk with this approach, as even 
the most casual reading of the anti-trust division websites in the US or in Europe 
indicates, is that it will excite the interest of the anti-trust authorities.  When allied with 
the amnesty policies that these administrations (and others) operate, this significantly 
increases the probability that such cooperative agreements will be discovered and their 
members prosecuted.  By contrast, partial collusion in which the firms cooperate on the 
mode by which the distant market is to be served but not on whether and with what 
quantity it is to be served is much less likely to excite suspicion and investigation.  
                                                 
2  It also applies to the growth of South-South intra-industry fdi.   
3  This contrasts with the literature on multi-market contact inspired by the seminal analysis of Bernheim 
and Whinston (1990).  Their approach looks at the strategic use of mergers or other means to increase the 
number of markets in which rivals simultaneously compete in order to facilitate tacit cooperation on output 
or prices. 
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Using a general model of the export/fdi choice4 we first identify the parameter 
region for which the prisoners’ dilemma characterizes the static Nash equilibrium. We 
then identify the conditions under which the rival firms can sustain a tacitly cooperative 
agreement to export rather than invest.  As might be expected, this region is more 
extensive the lower is the discount factor that the firms employ.   By contrast, we show 
that a reduction in trade costs can actually undermine tacit cooperation.  In other words, 
in our repeated game setting there are situations in which fdi is actually encouraged by 
reduced rather than increased trade costs. 
Our basic model is presented and analyzed in the next section.  Section 3 
illustrates this analysis using two specific examples: Cournot competition with iso-elastic 
demand and homogeneous goods, Cournot competition with linear demand and 
differentiated goods. Some comments on the welfare properties of tacit cooperation are 
briefly outlined in section 4.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Model and Analysis 
We develop a model that is standard in the fdi literature.  There are two firms, 
each with established operations in their domestic markets and each considering how to 
supply the foreign market: firm a (b) is located in country A (B).  The supply modes that 
the firms consider are Export or Invest.  If Export is chosen there are export costs of t per 
unit in supplying the foreign market5 while if Invest is chosen there are fixed set-up costs 
                                                 
4  The simplifications are that we consider a duopoly game, assume that the rival firms have already 
established domestic operations and we confine attention to the parameter regions in which Export is 
feasible. 
5  We are agnostic on whether these are transport, tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade and on whether they 
are linear or “iceberg” costs.  We do, however, assume that these costs are independent of the degree of 
product differentiation. 
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F to establish the foreign subsidiary.   All production costs are constant and identical at c 
per unit.6   
2.1 The Static Game 
Denote by K(ci, cj) (K = D, F)  the profit that firm i makes from sales in market K 
when its marginal costs are ci and its rival’s marginal costs are cj, where K = D (F) is the 
domestic (foreign) market for i.7   This gives the pay-off matrix for the static game in 
Table 1. 
For (Invest, Invest) to be a Nash equilibrium to this game requires: 
  F c,c   F   F c  t,c   F  F1   F c,c    F c  t,c     (1) 
The right-hand side of (1) is positive – a firm earns higher profits when it is low-cost than 
when it is high-cost, given that its rival is low-cost – so that there is a non-empty range of 
set-up costs for which (Invest, Invest) is a Nash equilibrium.  Since  F c  t,c  t  0 
we have F1 t  0.   This is just the familiar property that the critical value F1 of set-up 
costs below which (Invest, Invest) is a Nash equilibrium of the static game is increasing 
in export costs.  
A characteristic of our approach is that each firm’s choice of Export or Invest is 
independent of its rival’s choice.  This follows directly from the modeling assumption 
that the two firms are located in different countries. As a result, so long as (1) is satisfied 
Invest is also a dominant strategy for both firms.   This does not limit the generality of 
our analysis.  A different interdependence between the supply modes would apply if we 
were to assume that the firms were headquartered in the same country (or, equivalently, 
                                                 
6  Our analysis is qualitatively unaffected but analytically much messier if the firms have different 
production costs.  
7  The profit functions are, of course, derived from the consumer demand functions.  We illustrate our 
general analysis using demand specifications that are quite standard in the oligopoly literature. 
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were located in A and B but were considering the supply mode for a third country C).8  In 
the interests of brevity we do not present this case, particularly since it gives the same 
qualitative results as the analysis below. 
Table 1: Near Here 
(Invest, Invest) is a Nash equilibrium of a prisoner’s dilemma game if, in addition 
to (1) we have:   
 
D c,c    F c,c   F  D c,c  t    F c  t,c  
F  F2 max 0,D c,c    F c,c   D c,c  t    F c  t,c        (2) 
The loss of profit that a firm suffers as a result of its rival investing in its market as 
opposed to exporting to it must exceed the additional profit that the firm earns from 
investing in rather than exporting to the rival’s market. 
For there to be a non-empty range of F for which (Invest, Invest) leads to a 
prisoner’s dilemma requires that F2 < F1.  From (2) and (1) this requires: 
D c,c  t   D c,c   0       (3) 
This inequality holds.  A low-cost firm always earns more profit when its rival is high-
cost than when it is low-cost.  (Invest, Invest) as a Nash equilibrium to the static game 
gives rise to a prisoners’ dilemma if set-up costs lie in the non-empty range [F2, F1].9   
Our analysis of the static game can be summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: In the static duopoly game there is a non-empty range of set-
up costs F  [F2, F1] for which (Invest, Invest) is a Nash equilibrium of the 
                                                 
8  This is, for example, the implicit assumption in Knickerbocker’s analysis. 
9  A natural question to ask is whether a similar prisoners’ dilemma arises in the parameter region for 
which (Export, Export) is a Nash equilibrium to the static game.  This would require the conditions F > F1 
and F < F2, which are contradictory. 
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static game but in which both firms would be better off with Export. This 
range is increasing in export costs. 
Proof: 
From (1) we have F1t  
 F c  t,c 
t
( )
 0.  We cannot sign F2 t unambiguously but 
from (2) we have F2t  
D c,c  t 
t
()
  F c  t,c t
( )
 F1t                  
2.3 The Repeated Game 
As we noted in the introduction, one way in which firms may “escape” a 
prisoners’ dilemma is if the underlying game is repeated indefinitely, an assumption that 
appears to be perfectly reasonable in the context of firms undertaking fdi. 
Consider, therefore, the conditions that have to hold for the prisoner’s dilemma to 
be resolved by partial collusion in a repeated game.  By partial collusion in this context, 
we mean an agreement on the mode by which the foreign market is to be served but not 
on the quantities to be supplied or the prices to be charged.10  
Suppose that set-up costs lie in the range [F2, F1].  Suppose further that the static 
game of Table 1 is infinitely repeated.   The question that we ask is whether the firms can 
sustain a tacit agreement to Export, by adopting the standard Nash reversion trigger 
strategy: “I shall Export in the current period so long as we have both chosen Export in 
every previous period.  If either of us has chosen Invest in any previous period I shall 
switch to Invest forever.”  An attractive feature of this type of partial collusion is that 
deviation is easily and quickly detected.  A firm might not be able to monitor its rival’s 
                                                 
10  We have borrowed this term from Friedman and Thisse (1993). 
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choice of output or price but it should be able to detect that the rival has established a 
production facility in the firm’s market.  
For this strategy to sustain the tacit agreement to Export, standard analysis 
(Pepall, Richards and Norman, 2008) indicates that the discount factor  must satisfy: 
 
  l  D c,c  t    F c,c   F D c,c  t    F c  t,c D c,c  t    F c,c   F D c,c    F c,c   F
  F c,c    F c  t,c   FD c,c  t   D c,c 
  (6) 
The numerator is the one-period gain that a firm makes in the foreign market if it cheats 
on the agreement while the denominator is the per-period loss of profits in the domestic 
market that results from the collapse of the agreement.  
As F  F1 we have   0 and the tacit agreement can always be sustained.  As F 
 F2 we have   1 and the tacit agreement is increasingly difficult to sustain.  The 
intuition is straightforward.  As F  F2 the static game “looks” less and less like a 
prisoner’s dilemma and so there are smaller gains to be had from tacit cooperation.  By 
contrast as F  F1 the prisoner’s dilemma characteristics of the static game become more 
pronounced and there are greater gains to be had from cooperation. 
For any discount factor  < 1, we can rewrite (6) explicitly in terms of the critical 
value of set-up costs above which cooperation is sustainable: 
 F  F3     F c,c    F c  t,c   D c,c  t   D c,c     (7) 
Note that, from (1) and (2), this can be written: 
 F3    1 F1  F2        (8) 
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In other words, F3() is a convex combination of F1 and F2, confirming that there is 
always a non-empty parameter region in which partial collusion is sustainable. 
Clearly F3     0.  The critical value of the set-up costs above which the 
agreement to export is sustainable is decreasing in the discount factor.   Intuitively, an 
increase in the discount factor increases the value of cooperation as opposed to defection 
and so increases the range of set-up costs for which cooperation is sustainable.  We can 
put this another way.  From (6), l F  0.    As set-up costs increase, the gains from 
cheating on the agreement are weaker whereas the gains from adhering to the agreement 
are unchanged.  The tacit agreement is, therefore, easier to sustain.  We can summarize 
this part of the analysis as follows: 
Proposition 2: If the duopoly game is infinitely repeated a tacit agreement by 
both firms to Export is sustainable by a Nash reversion trigger strategy for 
set-up costs in the range F  [F3(), F1]  [F2, F1].  This range is increasing 
in the discount factor .  
Now consider the impact of a change in export costs. We can state: 
Proposition 3: The range of set-up costs [F3(), F1] over which a tacit 
agreement to Export is sustainable by a Nash reversion trigger strategy is 
smaller when export costs are lower. 
Proof: From (1) and (7) we have: 
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F3  
t 
F1
t 
D c,c  t 
t
()
 F1t        
 Proposition 3 of itself does not suggest that a reduction in export costs will have a 
non-intuitive impact on the export/fdi choice.11  However, from (7) we also have:   
 
F3  
t  
 F c  t,c 
t
()
 D c,c  t t
()
     (9) 
 
The sign of F3   t is ambiguous.  It is certainly positive when  = 0 but may 
be negative as   1.   This is important since F3   t  0 gives the apparently 
perverse result that a decrease in export costs may actually cause a switch from exporting 
to foreign direct investment.  Intuitively, a decrease in export costs increases both the per-
period loss of profits that are suffered if the agreement collapses and the one-off increase 
in profits that cheating generates.  The higher is the discount factor the more weight a 
firm places on the one-off gain.    
We can state the following: 
Proposition 4: If the duopoly game is infinitely repeated, a sufficient 
condition for there to be a discount factor t < 1 above which F3   t  0 
is that  F c  t,c  t  D c,c  t  t .  If this condition is satisfied a 
decrease in trade costs may cause a switch from exporting to FDI. 
In other words, F3   t  0 if the impact of an increase in export costs on 
overseas profit is less than its impact on domestic profit. 
 
                                                 
11  Suppose, however, that the set-up cost F is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, Fu] with Fu > F1. 
Proposition 3 suggests that the probability that a tacit agreement to Export can be sustained is lower when 
export costs are lower. 
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It is tempting to conjecture that this condition is more likely to be satisfied when 
exports costs are high since then overseas profit is low while domestic profit is high.  
Suppose that export costs are linear at t per unit exported. We can state the following: 
Proposition 5: Denote by ˆ t  the export cost above which exports are not 
feasible. Then there exists an export cost tl above which F3   t  0. 
Proof: Profit from exporting can be written  F  P QF ,QD   c  t QF . 
Differentiate with respect to t to give  
 F
t  P QF ,QD   c  t  QFt  QF
P QF ,QD 
QF
QF
t 
P QF ,QD 
QD
QD
t



QF  
As  we have .  As a result as  we have 
.  By contrast Dt  0  t.        
 
3. Examples 
3.1 Cournot Competition with Identical Products and Iso-Elastic Demand 
Assume that consumer demand is iso-elastic, Q  P, or in inverse form: 
P  Q1  Q2  1  ( > 1)       (10) 
where  is the elasticity of demand.  Further assume that export costs are linear at t per 
unit exported. 
Table 2 details the relevant profit functions for the two models ignoring the set-up 
costs and also identifies the range of export costs for which Export is feasible.12  
Table 2: Near Here 
                                                 
12  Detailed calculations are omitted in the interests of brevity.  They can be obtained from the authors on 
request.   
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Substituting these in (1) and (2) gives: 
 F1  2 1 
1

c 2
2c  1 
t  c  t 2
2c  t  1





     (11a) 
 F2  2 1 
1

2c 2
2c  1  
t  c  t 2
2c  t  1 
c  t 2
2c  t  1







   (11b) 
and F3() is given by (8). 
This example is illustrated in Figure 1 for  = 2 and two values of the discount 
factor, and in Figure 2 for  = 0.5 and two values of the price elasticity.13  The shaded 
areas are areas where we have a prisoners’ dilemma and the darker shaded area is where 
partial collusion to Export is sustainable. 
 
 = 0.5;  = 2
 
 = 0.7;  = 2 
 
Figure 1: Iso-Elastic Demand and the Discount Factor 
 
 
 = 0.5 
 
                                                 
13  In Figure 2 we restrict the t axis to the range of values for t over which exports are feasible when  = 
2.5.  
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Figure 2: Iso-Elastic Demand and the Elasticity of Demand 
 Provided that export costs are not “very low”, the critical value of set-up costs F1 
below which (Invest, Invest) is the one-shot equilibrium is lower when demand elasticity 
is higher.  Intuitively, a high price elasticity intensifies competition when firms are 
located in the same market.   Admittedly a high price elasticity also adversely affects 
profits from exporting, but as  exports tend to zero and the impact of price elasticity 
on exports also tends to zero.    By exactly the same argument, the critical value of set-up 
costs F3() above which partial collusion is sustainable in the repeated game is also lower 
when the demand elasticity is higher.  
As can be seen, there is, indeed, a critical value of exports costs tl above which 
F3   t  0.  Moreover, tl is lower when the discount factor is higher and when demand 
elasticity is higher.  An increase in either the discount factor or the price elasticity, by 
reducing F3(), makes partial collusion on Export sustainable where it otherwise would 
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not be, but also expands the range of export costs for which trade liberalization leads to a 
breakdown in partial collusion and a switch to fdi. 
3.2 Cournot Competition with Differentiated Products and Linear Demand 
Assume, as in Singh and Vives (1984) (hereafter SV) that inverse demand for 
firm i (i = a, b) is pi V qi  q j i  a,b; i  j .14  In this model  <  is an inverse 
measure of product differentiation.  Assume also that transport costs are linear at t per 
unit.  One potential problem with this model is that there are several parameters, making 
comparative static analysis problematic.  We can show, however, that the model reduces 
to a three-parameter model in f, g and  using the normalization:15 
  t V ; g   ; f  F V 2          (12) 
Intuition is aided if we substitute s = 1 – g (s  [0, 1]) as a direct measure of the degree of 
product differentiation. 
Table 3 details the relevant profit functions for this model ignoring the set-up 
costs.  Substituting these in equations (1) and (2) gives: 
f1  4 1 s  
3 2s s2 2 ; f2  max 0,
 2  5  2s 2    s2 2    
3 2s s2 2





  (13) 
while f3(s, , ) is given by (8).  These functions are illustrated in Figures 2(a) and (b) 
respectively.   
It is simple to confirm that in the SV model f1 s  0, f2 s  0 and 
f2 s  f1 s.  The range of set-up costs for which (Invest, Invest) is a Nash 
                                                 
14  The consumer utility function is U q1,q2   V q1  q2    q12  q22   2q1q2  2. 
15  Details are available from the author on request.   
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equilibrium increases with the degree of product differentiation but the range over which 
there is a prisoners’ dilemma decreases. 
Table 3: Near Here 
From Table 3 and equation (8) we obtain: 
f3 s,,   4 1 s  3 s 2 1 s 2 
 1 s   1 s   2 1 s  
3 s 2 1 s 2    (14) 
This example is illustrated in Figure 3 for  = 0.6 and  = 0.8 and in Figure 4 for 
two values of s – the degree of product differentiation. 
 = 0.8  = 0.6 
Figure 3: Differentiated Product and the Discount Factor 
After some manipulation we have: 
     (15) 
Since SV(s, ) < (1 + s)/2 (the upper limits on  for which Export is feasible – see Table 
3) – there is a non-empty range of export costs for which f3 s,,    0.  Moreover, as 
we should expect, this range is more extensive the higher is the discount factor:
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 SV s,    0.  By contrast,  SV s,  s  0.  A greater degree of product 
differentiation, by softening competition, ameliorates to at least some degree the 
prisoners’ dilemma “problem” and so reduces the range of export costs for which trade 
liberalization leads to a breakdown in partial collusion and a switch to fdi. 
 
Figure 4: Differentiated Product and the Degree of Product Differentiation 
 
4. Some (Very) Brief Welfare Comments 
Making welfare comparisons in these types of models is always complicated by 
the question of how to treat export costs and profits earned in the non-domestic market.  
As a result we shall confine ourselves in this section to some very brief comments.   
Note first that a decrease in export costs that leaves the supply mode (Export, 
Export) unchanged need not increase a firm’s profits.  In the SV case, for example, if the 
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firms export aggregate profit falls as  is reduced so long as   1 s 
2
s2  2s 5.
16  The reason 
for this is simple to explain.  A reduction in export costs increases export profits by 
making exports less expensive in the foreign market but decreases domestic profits by 
weakening import protection.  When export costs are high export quantity is low and the 
import protection effect dominates.  
By contrast, consumers always gain from a reduction in export costs since this 
toughens competition in their domestic market – the only market with which they are 
concerned. 
Now suppose that we are in the parameter region [0, F3()], so that the tacit 
agreement to Export is unsustainable.  Further suppose that the decrease in exports costs 
results in a switch to [Export, Export] in the repeated game.  The firms benefit since they 
are able to escape the prisoners’ dilemma but consumers lose.  Suppose, by contrast that 
we are in the parameter region [F3(), F1].  Further suppose that the decrease in export 
costs causes a breakdown in the tacit agreement to Export.  The firms lose but consumers 
gain.  
It is, of course, possible in either of these cases that total consumer and producer 
surplus is greater with [Export, Export] than [Invest, Invest].  However, is this really 
convincing as a justification for advocating a reduction in export costs that facilitates tacit 
collusion or rejecting a reduction in export costs because it undermines tacit collusion?  
This is the kind of justification that has been advanced by those who believe that cartels 
should be investigated on the basis a rule of reason but which has been rejected in favor 
of a per se rule by most anti-trust authorities. 
                                                 
16  It is straightforward to check that this lies within the feasible range of . 
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5. Conclusions 
A standard result in the literature on the export/fdi choice is that an increase in 
export costs may cause firms to switch from exporting to direct investment.  One puzzle 
with this result is that it seems to conflict with the rapid increase in fdi in a period when 
there has been significant trade liberalization.  It has, of course, been suggested that there 
is a simple explanation for this puzzle: the growing importance of free trade areas.  The 
problem with this, however, is that while it might, for example, be consistent with the 
growth of US investment in Europe, it cannot explain the almost parallel growth of 
European investment in the US.  
We suggest a different rationale in this paper.  A switch from exporting to direct 
investment in response to an increase in export costs does not mean that the firms gain 
from such a switch.  We have shown that in a static duopoly game there is always a non-
empty range of set-up costs for which [Invest, Invest] is the Nash equilibrium of a 
prisoners’ dilemma game: the duopolists are both better off with Export.  This range is 
greater the higher are export costs. Moreover, if export costs are “close” to the margin 
between export and fdi a small increase in transport costs that results in a switch to fdi 
always reduces the firms’ profits.  
Suppose that we are in this prisoners’ dilemma region.  If, by contrast, the firms 
are involved in an indefinitely repeated game – a not unrealistic scenario – it seems 
reasonable to suggest that they will seek to adopt a tacit agreement to Export, sustained 
by a simple Nash reversion trigger strategy.    
We have shown that there is, indeed, a non-empty range of set-up costs for which 
such a tacit agreement is sustainable.  This range is increasing in the discount factor but is 
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smaller when export costs are lower.  Of more direct relevance to our puzzle above, we 
have shown that the lower bound on this region, F3() may be non-monotonic in export 
costs and is more likely to be decreasing in export costs if the discount factor  is “high”.  
This suggests that we may see a switch from export to fdi in response to a reduction in 
export costs, if this reduction results in the tacit agreement to export being unsustainable.  
Note also that this result implies that we should see a switch from intra-industry trade to 
intra-industry (two-way) fdi in response to trade liberalization, an outcome that is at least 
consistent with the recent evidence on foreign direct investment. 
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Table 1: Pay-Off Matrix for the Static Game 
 
 
D(c, c); F(c, c)  
F(c + t, c)  
D(c, c + t)  
 c/( - 1) 
 
Table 2: Cournot with Iso-Elastic Demand and Homogeneous Goods  
 
 
D c,c  t    F c  t,c D c,c  t    F c  t,c 
D c,c    F c  t,c D c,c  t    F c,c   F
D c,c  t    F c,c   FD c,c    F c  t,c 
D c,c    F c,c   FD c,c    F c,c   F
2 1 1
2c  1 c
2
2 1 1
2c  t  1 t  c  t 
2
2 1 1
2c  t  1 c  t 
2
ˆ t 
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D(s: 0, 0); F(s: 0, 0)  
F(s: t, 0); F(s: , 0)  
D(s: 0, t); D(s: 0, )  
Range of t or  [0, (1 + s)/2]            
 
Table 3: Profit Equations for the SV Model 
 
 
1
3 s 2
1 s 2 2
3 s 2 1 s 2
1 s  1 s  2
3 s 2 1 s 2
